doi:

DOI:

Advances in Psychological Science (心理科学进展) 2018/26:5 PP.872-885

Sense of agency in the minimal self


Abstract:
Sense of agency (SoA),an important part of minimal self,is the experience of influencing the outside world through controlling one's behavior.Many researchers divided SoA into two parts according to the level of consciousness:feeling of agency (FoA) and judgment of agency (JoA).Different implicit and explicit paradigms are used to investigate the mechanism and connection of these two parts.Among the three core theories in this domain (i.e.comparator model,theory of apparent mental causation,and integration theory),integration theory has been supported by more evidence in recent years.Furthermore,researchers have made significant progress in the areas of distorted SoA and factors which influence SoA.In future,researchers could focus more attention on the changes in SoA in the social environment,the development of SoA,the multimodal integration in SoA,the relationship between SoA and sense of ownership (SO),as well as the neural mechanisms of SoA.

Key words:sense of agency,sense of ownership,self,motor intention

ReleaseDate:2018-07-02 16:10:48



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