doi:

DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2018.01244

Advances in Psychological Science (心理科学进展) 2018/26:7 PP.1244-1252

The investigation of minimal self based on self-illusion: The embodied constructivism position


Abstract:
According to whether it is extended in time, self can be divided into two important parts——minimal self and narrative self. Embodied constructivism holds the idea that distinguishing self from non-self is the core concept of minimal self. Therefore, defending the construction theory of self should emphasize the importance of the body itself. According to pathology and illusion studies of minimal self, investigating minimal self and self-other distinction by studying sense of ownership, sense of agency, as well as their deficits in certain disorders will be one fruitful path in current researches of self. Future studies could be focused on the discussion of the constructions of components, structures and processes of the self.

Key words:minimal self,embodied constructivism,sense of ownership,sense of agency,rubber hand illusion

ReleaseDate:2018-08-06 13:54:52



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